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Bastards, Brothers, and Unjust Warriors: En-
mity and Ethics in Just War Cinema  
Christopher J. Finlay 
Reader in Political Theory, University of Birmingham 
Abstract: How do members of the general public come to regard some uses of violence as legitimate and 
others as illegitimate? And how do they learn to use widely recognized normative principles in doing so 
such as those encapsulated in the laws of war and debated by just war theorists? This paper argues that 
popular cinema is likely to be a major source of influence especially through a subgenre that I call ‘Just 
War Cinema.’ Since the 1950s, many films have addressed the moral drama at the centre of contemporary 
Just War Theory through the figure of the enemy in World War II, offering often explicit and sophisticat-
ed treatments of the relationship between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello that anticipate or echo the 
arguments of philosophers. But whereas Cold War era films may have supported Just War Theory’s ambi-
tions to shape public understanding, a strongly revisionary tendency in Just War Cinema since the late 
1990s is just as likely to thwart them. The potential of Just War Cinema to vitiate efforts to shape wider 
attitudes is a matter that both moral philosophers and those concerned with disseminating the law of war 
ought to pay close attention to. 
Keywords: Just War Theory; cinema and international relations; the enemy. 
       
[W]e know enough, if we know we are the king’s subjects: if his cause be wrong, our 
obedience to the king wipes the crime of it out of us. 
William Shakespeare1 
Erm, Hans. […] Have you noticed that the little badges on our caps have actually got 
pictures of skulls on them? […A]re we the baddies? 
David Mitchell and Robert Webb2 
1 
How do members of the general public, especially lay persons so far as theoretical training is 
concerned, come to regard some uses of violence as legitimate and others as illegitimate? In 
particular, how do they come to do so using widely recognized normative principles such as 
those encapsulated in the laws of war and debated by just war theorists?  
Efforts by the International Committee of the Red Cross to promote awareness of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law (IHL) attest to the belief that the ability not only of combatants, 
                                                          
Acknowledgements: For written comments on the article at different stages, I would like to thank Paul 
Jackson, Steven de Wijze, Paul Schulte, and Rob Stone, as well as the editors and three anonymous refer-
ees for The Review of International Studies. 
1 Henry V, 4.1. 
2 David Mitchell and Robert Webb, ‘Nazis,’ in Amnesty International, The Very Best of the Secret Policeman’s 
Ball: the Greatest Comedy Line-Up Ever. (Edinburgh: Canongate Books, 2013), p. 381. 
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but also of civilians to understand and apply its principles is important.3 Belief in the im-
portance of informing public opinion likewise motivates some of the most influential work 
of recent decades by philosophers writing on just war theory. Michael Walzer’s classic Just 
and Unjust Wars (1977) was addressed to general readers as much as academics and his critics 
too present their scholarly work as part of an effort to shape and improve public understand-
ing.4 Nevertheless, philosophers often assume quite a wide public consensus on some of its 
basic principles. Walzer’s theory, for instance, offers an interpretative synthesis of ideas al-
ready embodied in a widely accepted tradition he refers to as the ‘War Convention’.5 Like-
wise, Jeff McMahan’s challenge to key components of the Walzerian interpretation is moti-
vated in part by the belief that they are widely accepted by the general public in the US and 
elsewhere.6 In particular, both assume widespread acceptance of what Walzer calls the ‘Doc-
trine of Moral Equality’ according to which lawful combatants opposing each other in war 
are equally entitled to fight regardless of whether their side is fighting for a just cause and are 
subject to exactly the same rules in doing so.7 If they are correct and there is such a wide-
spread ‘common sense’ about these things, then it raises an important question of how it 
might be accounted for.  
Presumably some learn it through formal instruction in schools and universities, through 
reading the philosophical literature or studying law, or through religious instruction. But I 
think it likely that many others acquire it implicitly or obliquely. One way to characterize this 
possibility is by reference to Cynthia Weber’s term, ‘moral grammars of war’. Knowledge of 
these ‘codes or contexts (or both) about the good and the bad that structure narratives of 
interpretation about war’ is often pre-theoretical and intuitive rather than formal and explicit 
and may be acquired just like the way children first grasp the principles of linguistic gram-
mar.8 They learn to use it without necessarily being able to name or explain many of its constit-
uents. And so, analogously, it may be that relatively few people know the technical vocabu-
lary for debating principles such as belligerent status and the Doctrine of Moral Equality, but 
they know how they work and demonstrate it when they invoke standards connected to 
them such as non-combatant immunity, prisoner of war rights, and war crimes.  
                                                          
3 See Yoshifumi Tanaka, ‘Treaty obligation to promote public education and the teaching of international 
law,’ European Journal of Legal Education, 4:2 (2007): 135-147, especially pp. 136-9. For a survey of popular 
knowledge of and attitudes towards IHL, see ICRC, ‘The People on War Report: ICRC Consultation on 
the Rules of War,’ Conducted by Greenberg Research, Inc. 1999. 
4 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: a Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. New York: Basic Books, 1977 
(2001 reprint); Jeff McMahan: see his Killing in War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 3, 6-7, 
and ‘Rethinking the “Just War,”’ New York Times, Nov. 11 & 12, 2012, available at: 
{http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/11/rethinking-the-just-war-part-1/}; 
{http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/12/rethinking-the-just-war-part-2/} (accessed No-
vember 2012). 
5 Walzer (1977), pp. 44ff. 
6 McMahan (2009), pp. 3-7. 
7 The ICRC (1999) found quite high levels of awareness of the Geneva Conventions, especially in the UK 
and Israel but also in the US and France.  
8 Cynthia Weber, Imagining America at War: Morality, Politics and Film. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), p. 5. 
Enmity and Ethics in Just War Cinema (forthcoming, Review of International Studies) 3 
 
3  
Grammatical ability of this sort is likely to be acquired through less formal channels. The 
People on War report, for instance, suggests that popular awareness of IHL is likely to be ‘de-
rived mainly through media reports’.9 But this overlooks another possibility, which is that 
some might learn the moral (and legal) grammar of war through fictional depictions of armed 
conflict. My argument, in fact, is that the widely accessible medium of the motion picture is 
likely to be a major source of influence on the popular grasp of these things, especially 
through a subgenre that I call ‘Just War Cinema.’ 
Movies contributing to Just War Cinema are identified by two characteristics: first, they are 
open to the possibility that war can be necessary and, hence, justifiable; second, as I hope to 
show, they raise and suggest answers to questions about the ethics of participating in just 
war. This category will not encompass all films that, as it were, ‘have something to say’ about 
the ethics of war: just as some philosophers reject the very idea of a just war, some filmmak-
ers adopt variants of a pacifist ‘anti-war’ stance, pillorying the idea that mass military killing 
can ever be wedded to justice. But it includes films adopting divergent ethical positions that 
shadow or anticipate those falling within the wider tradition of Just War Theory that I’ll out-
line below in section 2: some run closer to what is sometimes called the ‘orthodox’ view ex-
emplified by Walzer’s work; others challenge that view, promoting a moral perspective with 
something in common with the ‘revisionist’ Just War Theory associated with McMahan, 
Cécile Fabre and others.10 My aim is to show how Just War Cinema has thus (fore-) shad-
owed Just War Theory in the decades since World War II, sometimes anticipating and some-
times echoing, reinforcing, or challenging several of its central ethical arguments. This sug-
gests, at the very least, that combat cinema ought to be an interesting medium for ethicists: 
as Diane Jeske remarks, ‘[e]thics is an area of philosophy that demands the use of rich and 
detailed narratives, and so it behoves moral philosophers to attend to the uses to which they 
can put artistic works such as film and literature.’11 But more than this, it is an important 
finding that those concerned with public knowledge of the ethics and law of armed conflict 
ought to take seriously because their own chances of shaping public attitudes and opinion are 
likely to be affected for good or ill by interventions in such an accessible and emotive medi-
um.  
In the next section, I preface the analysis of films by highlighting, first, the moral drama at 
the heart of recent Just War Theory and then by saying something, second, about how Just 
War Cinema can be understood as intervening on different sides of the philosophical debate. 
Pivotal to both is the figure of the ‘Unjust Warrior,’ the enemy in a war fought for a just 
cause.  
 
                                                          
9 ICRC (1999), p. iv, n.2. 
10 McMahan (2009); Cécile Fabre, Cosmopolitan War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
11 Diane Jeske, ‘Review of Ward E. Jones and Samantha Vice (eds) Ethics at the Cinema, Oxford University 
Press, 2011,’ Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, November 9th 2011. Only one essay in the book examines a 
war film but the theme has received some attention from international relations scholars, however, e.g. in 
James Gow, ‘Strategic Pedagogy and Pedagogic Strategy,’ International Relations, 20.4 (2006): 393-406. 
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2 Enmity and ethics: the Rommel Paradox 
The moral drama in just war theory 
Recent debates in Just War Theory have uncovered a source of deep ambiguity in the moral 
status of the enemy in a Just War. According to ‘orthodox’ theorists, the rules of proper 
conduct that apply to soldiers in war (known as the jus in bello) apply independently of wheth-
er their side has a ‘just cause’ for war (the central principle of the jus ad bellum which concerns 
the justice of war). If you’re a combatant, in other words, the same rules apply whether or not 
you’re fighting in a ‘just war’. And just as it’s possible to fight unjustly (in bello) in a just war 
(ad bellum) by committing war crimes, for instance, it is likewise possible for you to fight just-
ly in an unjust war, chiefly by using force discriminately and proportionately.12 Walzer calls 
the idea underpinning this view the ‘Doctrine of Moral Equality’. As illustration, he cites the 
paradoxical status of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, whose high popular reputation for prin-
cipled (and highly effective) conduct as a soldier seems undiminished by the fact that he 
served on the side of the Third Reich in World War II. I’ll return to this Rommel paradox 
when I turn to his treatment in popular films below. 
The less controversial consequence of this idea is that both those who fight for a just cause 
(‘Just Warriors’ from now on) and those who don’t (‘Unjust Warriors’) are subject to the 
same constraints: all, for instance, are prohibited from intentionally targeting non-
combatants.13 More problematic, however, is the belief that Unjust Warriors are morally justi-
fied in attempting to kill Just Warriors: enemy soldiers have as much right to try to kill you as 
you have to try and kill them even if they are the aggressors and you fight only to defend the 
innocent against them. ‘Revisionist’ Just War Theory challenges this aspect of the orthodox 
view, arguing that even if the Doctrine of Moral Equality corresponds to the law of war, it 
cannot be the right way to view the morality of killing. This is because it flatly contradicts 
deeper, more general moral convictions about the wrongfulness of harming innocent people 
and the right to defend them, which revisionists argue are relevant to times both of war and 
of peace.14 
To illustrate, imagine seeing an innocent person wrongfully attacked in peacetime. If it was 
the only way to avoid being killed, would you think it wrong of them to use force in self-
defence? I presume not. But what if the victim’s attempt at self-defence threatened to harm 
the attacker? Would the attacker then have a corresponding right of self-defence in return? I 
think most people would say that only the victim of a wrongful attack had the right of self-
defence, not the attacker. And, indeed, this is also the ‘common law’ view.15 What this shows 
                                                          
12 Walzer (1977), p. 21. 
13 Though see McMahan (2009), chap. 5 and Fabre (2012), chap. 2. 
14 E.g. McMahan (2009); Fabre (2012). 
15 See, for instance, Crown Prosecution Service (UK) legal guidance on ‘Self-Defence and the Prevention 
of Crime’ {http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/s_to_u/self_defence/} (accessed 23 April 2016). For a discus-
sion of both Common Law and the Model Penal Code in the US, see Josh Gilliland on George Lucas’s 
controversial re-editing of Star Wars IV (1977): ‘Han’s Justification for Shooting Greedo First’ (2012) 
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is that defensive rights as commonly understood are asymmetric: victims can claim them 
against aggressors; aggressors cannot claim them in return while aggressing. Now, if war is mor-
ally justified when necessary as a means of defending innocent people from wrongful threat 
(the Poles from the Third Reich; European Jews from Nazi genocide; and so on), then the 
morality of self-defence would appear to present significant problems for the Doctrine of 
Moral Equality. From the perspective of the jus ad bellum, Just Warriors are those who exer-
cise rights of self- and other-defence (on behalf of themselves and others). And by definition, 
Unjust Warriors are those posing the wrongful threat. Surely, therefore, the jus in bello should 
usually recognize only those fighting for a just cause as having the moral right to kill? So, far 
from supporting equal combat rights, the ethics of self-defence seems to indicate that Unjust 
Warriors who kill their Just enemies commit a very serious moral wrong. 
There is, however, a dramatic tension between the morality of war and the law of war. Even 
some revisionists who reject the Doctrine of Moral Equality accept that an artificial regime of 
legal equality is necessary in the current international order.16 Accepting that there are signifi-
cant practical dangers in recognizing belligerent rights only on the just side, McMahan fol-
lows Walzer in defending an apparatus similar in form to what Carl Schmitt calls ‘conven-
tional enmity’. Once a state of war is established de facto and recognized de jure, then op-
posing sides acknowledge their armed opponents as combatants, granting them the ‘war 
privilege’ as a trade-off to incentivize greater respect for non-combatant immunity.17 Other-
wise, as Walzer warned, ‘[w]ithout the equal right to kill, war as a rule-governed activity 
would disappear and be replaced by crime and punishment, by evil conspiracies and military 
law enforcement.’18  
All of which puts the enemies of those (who believe themselves to be) fighting a just war in 
an acutely ambiguous position which is at the heart of the moral drama explored by both Just 
War Theory and Just War Cinema. The law permits soldiers on both sides to cast off their uni-
forms and, hence, their identity as warriors, Just or Unjust, at the war’s end provided they 
abide by IHL. But if you were a combatant captured by soldiers believing themselves to be 
fighting a Just War made necessary by the wrongs of your side, they may be tempted to judge 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
available at: {http://thelegalgeeks.com/2012/08/20/han-shot-first-a-legal-discussion/}(accessed, April 
2016). Lucas’s motivation for altering the 1997 version to make Greedo shoot before Han Solo kills him 
was partly pedagogic: ‘when you’re John Wayne,’ he says, ‘you don’t shoot people [first] — you let them 
have the first shot. It’s a mythological reality that we hope our society pays attention to’ (in Hank Stuever, 
‘George Lucas: To feel the true force of ‘Star Wars,’ he had to learn to let it go,’ Washington Post, Decem-
ber 5, 2015, available at: {https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/george-lucas-to-feel-the-true-
force-of-star-wars-he-had-to-learn-to-let-it-go/2015/11/27/d752067a-8b1f-11e5-be8b-
1ae2e4f50f76_story.html} (accessed, April 2016).) 
16 Jeff McMahan, ‘The Morality of War and the Law of War,’ in D. Rodin and H. Shue (eds.) Just and Un-
just Warriors: the Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 27. Fabre sets 
aside the question of laws to concentrate on purely moral analysis (2012: 12). 
17 McMahan (2008), pp. 27ff; Walzer (1977), p. 41; on Schmitt’s idea, see Gabriella Slomp, ‘The Theory of 
the Partisan: Carl Schmitt’s Neglected Legacy,’ History of Political Thought, 26.3 (2005): 502-19, p. 509. 
18 Walzer (1977), p. 41. 
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you by at the bar of morality rather than law. To be sure, you fought discriminately so far as 
the law is concerned, but you now stand before comrades of the Just Warriors it permitted 
you to kill. As far as they are concerned, their fallen friends were the innocent victims of 
morally wrongful attack. McMahan has even argued that from a purely moral point of view, 
Unjust Warriors may be morally liable to be harmed if it could ‘significantly contribute to the 
achievement of the just cause’ or to the safety of the Just Warriors while fighting for it.19 But 
captured enemies will be all the more vulnerable if their captors are in any case tempted to 
seek summary ‘justice’ to avenge their fallen comrades – a prominent theme in Just War Cin-
ema. 
The theory in Just War Cinema 
Recent philosophical debates thus highlight a dramatic moral tension in the way enemy sol-
diers are apt to be judged, arising between the egalitarianism of the law (and the contested 
Doctrine of Moral Equality), which exonerates them if they have fought discriminately, and 
the ‘deep morality of war,’ as McMahan calls it, which may yet condemn them for killing 
morally innocent Just Warriors.20 As I will show in parts 3 and 4, Just War Cinema has paid 
close and careful attention to this tension. The films discussed in the two parts of section 3 
tend towards the Walzerian orthodoxy by focusing on the reasons why people find them-
selves fighting for the wrong side and enjoining audiences to extend a sense of compassion 
(even admiration) beyond the trenches of ‘their own’ soldiers. By contrast, those I analyse at 
the first part of section 4 appeal to the moral intuition that killing in an unjust war cannot be 
justifiable and may have grave consequences for perpetrators. The second part of section 4, 
finally, reads Quentin Tarantino’s Inglourious Basterds (2009) as a complex reductio of these 
more one-sided treatments. 
Two factors guided the selection of films. First, I focus almost exclusively on films set in the 
Second World War and chiefly those focusing on the encounter with German enemies. 
These are the films that have contributed most to the unfolding debates of Just War Cinema. 
Pictures set in the Vietnam War or Iraq after 2003, in western Europe during World War I, 
or even on the eastern front in World War II, can afford to express a more comprehensively 
anti-war view due to popular willingness to question the justifications offered by all sides in 
those theatres. Such scepticism is nearly impossible in settings that see GIs confronting 
Germans fighting for an empire animated by Nazi ideology. As Thomas Doherty writes, 
‘Postwar antiwar cinema stopped short of pacifism because of the more persuasive anti-
antiwar cinema of the Second World War.’21 While peacenik filmmakers dealing with Vi-
etnam could afford to forget the idea of the just war entirely, ‘the World War II mythos 
                                                          
19 McMahan (2008), p. 22. 
20 For thorough analysis of the effects of knowledge, evidence, and duress on responsibility, see 
McMahan (2009).  
21 Thomas Doherty, Projections of War: Hollywood, American Culture and World War II, revised ed. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 295-6, 279. ‘World War II in Europe [is] the paradigm,’ for Walzer, 
‘of a justified struggle’ (1977, p. xxii). 
Enmity and Ethics in Just War Cinema (forthcoming, Review of International Studies) 7 
 
7  
emerged from postwar history with its honor intact.’22 The ‘confrontation with Nazism’ on 
screen ‘concentrated the mind powerfully’ and films like Catch 22 (1970) and Slaughterhouse 
Five (1972) that attempted a more thoroughgoing rejection of war in a European setting be-
tween 1939 and 1945 were rare and commercially unsuccessful. The idea of the just war is 
therefore encoded within the World War II combat movie as one of its basic moral presup-
positions.23 This is what David Mitchell and Robert Webb allude to in the joke quoted at the 
top of this article. Realizing he’s the ‘baddy,’ Mitchell’s SS officer reviews his predicament in 
light of ‘a lot of films’ he’s seen and becomes anxious about his ‘place in the narrative struc-
ture of this war’: as he says, the SS skulls (and, implicitly, the evil they symbolize) leave the 
victors with little work to do in vilifying the defeated enemy retrospectively.24 Audience 
awareness of the Allied cause isn’t always taken for granted, however, and filmmakers (and 
their backers) often take care to remind audiences of what was ultimately at stake with refer-
ences to German oppression and the Holocaust.25  
As a second selection criterion, I concentrate on films showing the most articulate awareness 
of the moral drama of the enemy in a just war. Rather than merely illustrating ideas about 
conflict, these films offer a variety of moral arguments, often making an appeal to the sympa-
thies of the audience that is not only emotional but also intellectual.26 According to Stephen 
Mulhall, films don’t simply offer ‘handy or popular illustrations of views and arguments 
properly developed by philosophers’ but commonly may be read as ‘reflecting on and evalu-
ating such vie.ws and arguments [and] thinking seriously and systematically about them in 
just the ways that philosophers do.’27 This might overstate the point a little, as some suspect, 
but I think the general idea is right and it finds an echo in other sources. Among Just War 
Theorists, for instance, Jean Bethke Elshtain declared that sometimes ‘American films have 
done a better job of grappling with the question of force than many contemporary analysts 
and commentators’.28 And among film critics, Roger Ebert has interpreted Steven Spielberg’s 
Saving Private Ryan (1998) as a ‘philosophical’ movie that offers its ‘argument’ chiefly through 
photographic images, thereby bypassing express verbal declaration.29  
                                                          
22 Clive Stafford Smith, Director of Reprieve, recently suggested: ‘If you ask people which wars of the 20th 
century were genuinely worth fighting, most of them would say, only the second world war. We have a 
collective psychosis that war can solve problems. To that extent, movies [that reinforce this idea] can be 
dangerous’ (in Henry Barnes, ‘Death From Above,’ Guardian G2, April 15, 2016: 4-7, p. 7.) 
23 Doherty (1999), pp. 295-6, 279 
24 Mitchell and Webb (2012), p. 384.  
25 On which, see Peter Lev, Twentieth-Century Fox: the Zanuck-Zkouras Years, 1935-1965 (Austin, TX: Uni-
versity of Texas Press, 2013), pp. 237-39, regarding The Longest Day (1962). 
26 By contrast with Matthew Evangelista’s rich analysis in Gender, Nationalism and War: Conflict on the Movie 
Screen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) I’m interested in films as a possible influence shap-
ing public attitudes.  
27 Stephen Mulhall, On Film, Second Edition (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 4. 
28 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Just War Against Terror: the Burden of American Power in a Violent World (New York: 
Basic Books, 2004), p. 54. 
29 Roger Ebert, Review of Saving Private Ryan, July 24, 1998, available at: 
{http://www.rogerebert.com/reviews/saving-private-ryan-1998} (accessed, April 2016). Nigel Morris 
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Among the films to which I now turn, some track orthodox Just War Theory by offering 
narratives of exculpation, distancing Unjust Warriors from the regime for which they fight or 
shifting moral evaluation onto a different footing from the jus ad bellum, discussed in the next 
section. Others (discussed in the section after that) challenge this view by inculpating Unjust 
Warriors, emphasising the cause of war and invoking intuitions about innocence, guilt, and 
the jus ad bellum.30  
3 The Unjust Warrior exculpated 
There are two distinct exculpation narratives in Just War Cinema. More common, perhaps, is 
the one that finds common humanity between the ordinary foot-soldiers on all sides, which I 
discuss in the second part of this section. But I begin with some leading examples of a differ-
ent approach in which the enemy is a sort of aristocratic hero whose outstanding qualities 
render him a worthy enemy. 
Worthy Enemies 
When it was released only six years after the defeat of Nazi Germany, the sympathetic treat-
ment of the eponymous hero of The Desert Fox: the Story of Rommel (1951) provoked wide-
spread controversy in the US.31 The Production Code Administration had already raised 
‘scathing objections’ to the script, questioning its ‘glorification of professional soldiers and 
militarism’ among other things.32 A press release endorsed by leading American Jewish or-
ganizations denounced it as ‘a ghastly mockery of the lesson of history’ while the New York 
Times saw in it a failure of moral judgement.33 By contrast, on its eventual German release, 
the Hamburger Freie Presse welcomed the presentation of ‘German soldiers and officers not as 
criminals and murderers but as decent people’.34 But it was to be only the first of many sig-
nificant examples of this sort of narrative in post-war cinema including the treatments of 
Christian Diestl, a fictional German officer in The Young Lions (1958),35 senior German com-
manders including Rommel in The Longest Day (1962),36 and Wilhelm Bittrich, a historical 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
comments on ‘the ethical and military niceties debated so assiduously within the film’ in The Cinema of Ste-
ven Spielberg: Empire of Light (London: Wallflower Press, 2007), p. 294. 
30 On exculpation and inculpation, see Christopher Kutz, ‘The Difference Uniforms Make: Collective Vio-
lence in Criminal Law and War,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 33.2 (2005): 148–180 
31 Dir. Henry Hathaway. [DVD]. UK: Twentieth-Century Fox Home Entertainment. Produced by Nun-
nally Johnson. 
32 Quoted in Lev (2013), pp. 188-89. 
33 Brian C. Etheridge, ‘The Desert Fox, Memory Diplomacy, and the German Question in Early Cold War 
America,’ Diplomatic History, 32.2 (2008): 207-38, pp. 207-8; Bosley Crowther, ‘Curious Twist: New a 
German General is Heroized on Screen,’ New York Times, October 28, 1951. 
34 Lev (2013), p. 189. 
35 Dir. Edward Dmytryk. [DVD]. UK: MGM Home Entertainment. Producer, Alexander Lichtman. 
36 Dir. Ken Annakin, Andrew Marton, and Bernhard Wicki. [DVD]. UK: Twentieth-Century Fox Home 
Entertainment. 
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Waffen-SS General in A Bridge too Far (1977)37. Appetite for such films no doubt had a great 
deal to do with the international political context – as Peter Lev writes about The Longest Day, 
the producer Darryl F Zanuck ‘probably felt that a movie presenting the Germans as worthy 
adversaries would be accepted’ at a time when ‘the Soviet Union was threatening and the US 
was defending Berlin’.38  
In this kind of story, the Unjust Warrior achieves a heroic status in spite of the country he 
serves. Yes, he fights on the wrong side but for motives with which it is possible to sympa-
thize, not out of enthrallment to racist ideology but rather from a sense of duty and service 
that deserves (our) respect. As Bosley Crowther wrote in his review of The Desert Fox in 1951, 
the enemy appears as ‘a type which, except for the uniform, is indistinguishable from all the 
familiar and conventional representations of the heroic officers on “our” side’.39 The key 
idea is established by drawing a line between the good soldier and the poor soldier that cuts 
across the dichotomy between Just Warriors and Unjust Warriors. Poor soldiers, like good 
soldiers, are found on all sides in every war. ‘Worthy Enemy’ narratives focus attention on 
the exceptional qualities of a ‘good’ Unjust Warrior and contrast them with these inferior 
people (whether they are Just or Unjust), thereby displacing the more purely moral ad bellum 
distinction as the main focus of attention.  
If the jus ad bellum constructs the categories of just and unjust deontologically, the story of 
the Unjust Warrior, here, speaks in the language, at one level, of virtue ethics. The good sol-
dier is distinguished from his inferiors by superior virtues of three distinct though, in im-
portant ways, related kinds: first, ‘military’ excellence (a technical virtue but one with moral 
consequences); second, ‘moral’ virtues of clemency and restraint; and third, perhaps more 
problematically, the ‘civic’ virtue of dutiful obedience. Worthy Enemy stories don’t mark a 
Nietzschean shift from moral binaries (of ‘good / evil’) to non-moral (‘good / bad’) but offer 
a more complex, hybrid taxonomy.40 
All these films highlight military excellence. Rommel’s reputation for ingenuity and daring is 
announced in Desert Fox in a memorandum from the Allied commander-in-chief to his staff 
insisting that Rommel is merely ‘an ordinary German general,’ not some kind of ‘superman’. 
Diestl and Bittrich (respectively in The Young Lions and A Bridge Too Far) both appear in mili-
                                                          
37 Dir. Richard Attenborough. [DVD]. UK: MGM Home Entertainment. Producer, Joseph E. Levine. 
There are some similarities in the treatment of Anthony Quayle’s character in J. Lee Thompson’s Ice Cold 
in Alex (1958).  
38 Lev (2013), p. 238; See also J Hoberman, An Army of Phantoms: American Movies and the Making of the Cold 
War (New York: the New Press, 2011), p. 178 and Etheridge (2008) on Cold War contexts for US war 
films with sympathetic German characters. Also Stephen E Ambrose, Spielberg’s historical advisor for 
Saving Private Ryan: ‘The Longest Day offered a kind of exculpation […] for a worthy, chastened, and now 
useful former foe’ (‘The Longest Day (US, 1962): “Blockbuster” History,’ in John Whiteclay Chambers II 
and David Culbert (eds) World War II, Film and History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 
105).  
39 Crowther (1951). On chivalry and duties of obedience, see Walzer (1977), pp. 34-7, 38-9. 
40 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality [1887], ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1997), First Treatise. 
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tary encounters where their leadership and expertise are decisive in securing German success. 
As a much more recent example, The Sinking of the Laconia (2011) culminates with Admiral 
Dönitz awarding the ace U-Boat commander, Werner Hartenstein, the Knight’s Cross for his 
share of Allied tonnage destroyed.41  
At first glance, military prowess might seem unlikely to generate sympathy given what the 
Unjust Warrior uses it for. But it may excite admiration and is morally significant in two dif-
ferent ways. First, military ability is about more than just being able to kill enemies in larger 
numbers; it is also about achieving military objectives efficiently. Efficiency minimises costs in 
combatant (and, collaterally, civilian) lives on both sides. This is one of the central moral 
themes running through A Bridge too Far. Its harsh focus on the incompetence of the Allied 
commanders is sharpened through the contrasting virtues of Bittrich, a key figure in thwart-
ing Operation Market Garden. While poor Allied planning and wishful thinking are seen 
wasting soldiers’ and civilians’ lives, Bittrich’s painstaking and sensible leadership minimizes 
costs and avoids armed confrontation unless it answers to military necessity.  
Purely technical virtue thus offers moral rewards by minimizing human suffering through the 
efficient use of force. But the Unjust Warrior is even more sympathetic when it appears 
hand-in-hand with clemency and restraint. To win while conceding tactical advantages for 
the sake of compassion or principle throws excellence into starker relief. Bittrich’s clemency 
motivates a temporary ceasefire to permit Allied wounded to seek medical attention behind 
German lines. Hartenstein concedes a major advantage to rival U-Boat commanders in their 
race to win the Knight’s Cross when tries to save survivors from the Laconia (and wins any-
way). His technical brilliance and moral restraint both contrast sharply with the thoughtlessly 
bureaucratic American air force commander who authorizes the bombing of the U-Boat in 
spite of clear signals that it was engaged in a humanitarian mission.42 
Unjust Warriors who unite technical and moral virtues are apt to provoke paradoxical emo-
tions in viewers whose natural ‘side’ is that of the Allies. When Diestl advises his superior to 
wait for the sun to rise behind his men before opening fire on a blinded convoy of British 
soldiers in The Young Lions, his superior capacity as a soldier is impressive even though it 
leads to a greater number of dead Just Warriors; and when he refuses the order to execute 
the wounded survivors, the film highlights the compatibility of military skill and determina-
tion with humaneness. Similarly, just as Rommel’s military successes inflict high human cost 
on the Allies, The Desert Fox underlines his principled insistence on the jus in bello when it 
shows him preventing a subordinate from coercing the captive Desmond Young. Voiced by 
the narrator Michael Rennie,43 Young captures the paradox at the end of the scene:   
So this, then, was Rommel [...], commander in chief of the enemy army, and the most 
celebrated German soldier since World War I. Already a legend in the desert, [...] his 
tricks and turns had made even the Tommies chuckle, which is scarcely the proper 
                                                          
41 Written by Alan Bleasedale and directed by Uwe Janson (BBC2 broadcast, 2011). 
42 Walzer also discusses the Laconia (1977, pp. 157-51). 
43 Lev (2013), p. 187. A similar scene occurs in The Desert Rats (1953). Cf. Walzer (1977), p. 38. 
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reflex to the enemy in times of war. In spite of which, he was still, of course, my en-
emy. The enemy not only of my country and the army in which I served, but of all 
life as I knew it. Not only of democracy as free men had fashioned it, but of civiliza-
tion itself.  
This eulogy to the ‘cool, hard, professional soldier [with a] scrupulous regard for the rules of 
warfare’ expresses the paradox acutely. His fight displays military prowess and discrimination 
but in the service of a regime marked by injustice in the highest degree. And if conscientious 
professionalism reduces battlefield casualties, his proficiency nevertheless brings death to 
many Just Warriors whose cause in fighting had simply been to prevent the expansion of the 
Nazi empire. How, then, can his engagement even in restrained and efficient killing be seen 
as something other than criminal? 
The Worthy Enemy narrative addresses this issue in a number of different ways. First, while 
the films all presuppose an audience morally aligned with the Allies, they also generally push 
the most damning aspects of the Third Reich into a carefully composed space in the back-
ground. At the end of The Young Lions, it is only by accident that Diestl, a volunteer, discov-
ers a concentration camp and its apparently secret purposes. He instantly turns away in dis-
gust, smashes his rifle, and deserts. The distance the film thus puts between the Warrior and 
the injustice for which he fights is epistemic. To use Francisco de Vitoria’s Thomistic term, 
Diestl suffered from ‘invincible error’: he acted in good faith, stepping forward to serve his 
people when they appeared to need him; he knew nothing of these other facts and as soon as 
he found out, he laid down arms.44 In many other films the Holocaust isn’t even mentioned, 
which may have something to do with (and it may, in turn, contribute to) a popularly accept-
ed story that, while genocide was the concern of the SS, the ordinary German army was gen-
erally focused exclusively on military matters (a narrative which Jonathan Littell’s novel, The 
Kindly Ones, painstakingly subverts).45  
A second approach is to highlight the importance of civic-military duty. This is the argument 
Rommel offers in Desert Fox when Karl Strölin tries to recruit him to the conspiracy against 
Hitler: ‘If this is politics, Strölin, I don’t want to hear it.’ Soldiers must obey. To do other-
wise, no matter what questions they might have about the regime as such, would be to make 
the very existence of armies impossible (no matter on whose side): ‘You aren’t naïve enough,’ 
he argues, 
to think that a soldier must approve of every detail of his government before he can 
fight for it. What army could exist like that, with every man in it free to decide what 
he will or won’t do? The truth is that a soldier has but one function in life, one lone 
excuse for existence, and that is to carry out the order of his superiors. The rest, in-
                                                          
44 Francisco De Vitoria, ‘On the Law of War’ [1539] in Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrence (eds) Vito-
ria: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 313. Cf. Fabre (2012), pp. 80-1.  
45 On the omission of any reference to genocide in The Longest Day, see Lev (2013), p. 238; also above, n. 
23. Jonathan Littell, The Kindly Ones (London: Chatto & Windus, 2009). 
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cluding government, is politics. And if I must remind you again, I’m a soldier not a 
politician.46 
This argument in particular was singled out in the protest from American Jewish groups: 
‘The audience is asked to believe that […] the soldier, Rommel, – and other German generals 
– were military men, without “political” aims or motivations, carrying out orders.’47 But it 
draws on arguments with a more respectable lineage that the film handles with some finesse. 
Francisco de Vitoria claims that, ‘if the subjects cannot serve [their prince] in the war except 
they are first satisfied of its justice, the state would fall into grave peril…’.48 Likewise, Im-
manuel Kant invokes Frederick the Great’s declaration, ‘Argue as much as you will and about 
whatever you will, but obey’, in his answer to the question ‘What is Enlightenment?’ Whereas a 
Rommel, on this view, might permissibly engage in public debate about war, he must not 
permit doubt to motivate insubordination. That would be an impermissible exercise of ‘pri-
vate reason’: 
What I call the private use of reason is that which one may make of it in a certain civil 
post or office with which he is entrusted. Now, for many affairs conducted in the in-
terest of a commonwealth a certain mechanism is necessary, by means of which some 
members of the commonwealth must behave merely passively, so as to be directed by 
the government, through an artful unanimity, to public ends (or at least prevented 
from destroying such ends). Here it is, certainly, impermissible to argue; instead, one 
must obey.49  
But Desert Fox also suggests duty has a limit. Whereas Young Lions draws the line at the dis-
covery of the Holocaust, Desert Fox defines it in terms of the military responsibilities of sol-
diers themselves. Normally (as Kant implies) the duty of the soldier is to manage effectively 
the means, leaving the question of ends to the political leaders. But what if the leader decides 
to interfere in the direction of the army’s role itself? This is decisive in the film. By taking 
over supreme command of the armed forces, Hitler (the suicidally incompetent ‘Bohemian 
corporal’) becomes an impediment to the operation of the means themselves. Consequently, 
it is not only consistent with the soldier’s duty but its corollary that he try to restore the ap-
propriate order. Far from accepting that soldiers have a duty to question their government 
and its purposes, Rommel’s decision to rebel therefore tracks and reinforces the separation 
of military duty (the means) from politics (the ends).50 
                                                          
46 In The Sinking of the Laconia, Hartenstein declares, ‘I have no political role, or actually interest … I have 
no concern but the safeguarding of my nation and the safety of those under my command.’ 
47 Etheridge (2008), pp. 207-8. 
48 Quoted in Walzer (1977), p. 39. Compare the translation in Vitoria (1991), p. 311. 
49 Immanuel Kant, ‘An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?’ [1784] in Kant: Practical Philoso-
phy, ed. and trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 18. 
50 I make no claim, one way or the other, as to the validity of this argument. I assert only that it is an ar-
gument and, moreover, a sophisticated one. 
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In sum, these films point their audience towards two important thoughts: first, that it is pos-
sible to be both an Unjust Warrior and an honourable, good, and, indeed, even a morally 
good, soldier.51 The second is that there may be a duty to obey, albeit one with intrinsic lim-
its defined by the means / ends distinction and by the idea that some ends (discovered by 
Diestl) are so patently wrong that they must be rejected without hesitation.52  
I turn now to a very different approach, familiar from many films, but exemplified by Sam 
Fuller’s The Big Red One (1980; 2004).53 
Common Servitude 
Released to rather lukewarm reception in 1980 due partly to cuts imposed by the studio, 
Fuller’s partly autobiographical film was reconstructed from surviving reels under the guid-
ance of Richard Schickel and rereleased in 2004 (the version I will cite below). Like The Young 
Lions, it presents parallel narratives, mirroring the actions and experiences of Just and Unjust 
Warriors, and like all the films discussed above it presupposes moral alignment with the Al-
lied side under the jus ad bellum. But by contrast with Worthy Enemy stories, films like The Big 
Red One invite us to consider the predicament of ordinary Unjust Warrior. They direct atten-
tion not at the ways soldiers might distinguish themselves, but at the common experience of 
unexceptional people who find themselves drafted into war, whether they believe it to be just 
or not. Since all are subject to this common discipline, it suggests, all deserve at least some 
common sympathy.54 War itself is the true enemy while the human adversary is an enemy 
only in a more contingent and limited way. As Lisa Dombrowski writes, ‘Fuller builds in par-
allels between World War II and World War I and between the protagonists and the enemy, 
suggesting that all war is the same, all soldiers are the same. The soldier’s job is to kill, and 
his job is to survive. End of Story.’55 Crucially, in this perspective, as soon as the state of war 
ends, soldiers cease to be liable to violence even if they were fighting on the wrong side. 
The Big Red One states three quite distinct arguments concerning (1) the permissiveness of war 
as an artificial legal condition; (2) the moral consequences of duress; and (3) war’s psychologi-
cal effects. While all three accuse the institution of war as a whole, all equally excuse the indi-
vidual whose misfortune it is to have to fight in one. 
The first is arguably The Big Red One’s most distinctive contribution. While the other argu-
ments are familiar from films both before and since (think of Lewis Milestone’s All Quiet on 
the Western Front (1930) and Sam Pekinpah’s Cross of Iron: Men on the Frontline of Hell (1977)), it 
is rare to see a film dramatize so carefully the effects of politics and legality in transforming 
actions that would ordinarily be murderous into licit acts of military ‘killing’ (one other ex-
                                                          
51 Cf. Walzer (1977), p. 21. 
52 Vitoria (1991), pp. 307-8; McMahan (2009), p. 65. 
53 The Big Red One: the Reconstruction. (2004) Dir. Samuel Fuller. [DVD]. UK: Warner Bros Entertainment 
Inc. Producer, Gene Corman. 
54 Cf. Walzer (1977), p. 36. 
55 Lisa Dombrowski, The Films of Samuel Fuller: If You Die, I’ll Kill You (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan Univer-
sity Press, 2008), p. 189. 
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ample, perhaps, being Jean Renoir’s La Grande Illusion (1937)). Two devices bring the matter 
into view. First, conversations between Lee Marvin’s anonymous ‘Sarge’ and Griff, a young 
private, highlight what Richard Schickel calls the movie’s ‘secondary theme’, the permission 
to kill.56 Griff is reluctant to engage in an action that he is used to calling ‘murder.’ Later, he 
recalls the Sarge’s words to another new recruit: ‘Oh, we don’t murder, we kill!’57  The sec-
ond device occurs in two nearly identical scenes, a preface and a coda, with Sarge accidentally 
trying to kill someone outside the legal state of war. In the preface, lost between trenches and 
blinded by fog (‘the fog of war’) at the end of World War One, he charges at an approaching 
German and kills him. But when he eventually finds his trench, Sarge discovers that the war 
had ended hours previously. At the very end of the film, he will bayonet another surrender-
ing German, again ignorant of the fact that war has just ended.  
As the conversations with Griff make clear, Sarge’s sense of guilt responds to the strange ar-
tifice of war as a legal state. The opening and closing scenes establish the idea that killing in 
war is not a matter of defending against those responsible for wrongful threat but of political 
authority and the permissive clauses of the law of war.58 Violence is permitted when condi-
tions are defined as ‘war’ by decisions taken beyond the soldier’s knowledge and control. But 
while the legal artifice of permissible ‘killing’ may impose feelings of undeserved guilt onto 
individuals who ‘murder’ by mistake, it more generally has the effect of shifting moral re-
sponsibility from the combatants and onto those distant, inscrutable individuals who wield 
the pen. As Sarge declares, whether the death you inflict is ‘murder’ or ‘killing’,  
all depends on a watch, a pen and a piece of paper. When the second hand of that 
watch calls the shot and the Kaiser picks up that pen and scratches his name on that 
paper, then you gotta call it quits. Kill all the huns you can before then, but never af-
ter, never.59 
In this perspective, war is a relation between states and not persons, as Rousseau argued; in-
dividuals are enemies due to the contingencies of citizenship, the obligation to serve in one’s 
own state, and the vagaries of international relations. Ordinary morality therefore isn’t the 
relevant framework for evaluating the interpersonal encounters that take place in battle.60 
Whereas for Renoir’s Grande Illusion, the moral arbitrariness of the law is marked spatially by 
the retreat of his fugitive POWs across the Swiss border (whose political reality invisibly cuts 
across a snow-covered meadow and beyond which their pursuers stop shooting at them), for 
                                                          
56 Richard Schickel, Audio Commentary on The Big Red One. 
57 Cf. Private Doll’s voiceover in Terence Malick’s The Thin Red Line (1998): ‘I killed a man. Worst thing 
you can do… Nobody can touch me for it’ ([Blu-ray] UK: Twentieth-Century Fox Home Entertainment). 
Thanks to an anonymous reader for suggesting this example. 
58 Again, cf. Walzer, 1977: 41. 
59 On the difficulties determining war’s beginning and ending (especially WWII) and the legal implications 
for criminal cases, see Mary L. Dudziak, War Time: an Idea, its History, its Consequences (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), chap. 2. 
60 J-J Rousseau, The Social Contract [1762] in The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, ed. Victor 
Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), book I, chap. 4; cf. Kutz (2005). 
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Fuller’s Sarge, the difference between the peculiar permissiveness of war and the morality of 
peacetime is marked by a division in time.  
In The Big Red One, soldiers endure two further features of war as a moral reality, both dimin-
ishing moral responsibility. One is duress. Like many others, Fuller’s film tells a story in which 
individuals fight due to coercion rather than virtue or duty. Their predicament is more apt to 
trigger compassion than the admiration sought by the Worthy Enemy story. Duress appears 
as the Soviet machine-gun trained on the Russian infantrymen’s backs as they advance on a 
German position in Jean-Jacques Annaud’s Enemy at the Gates (2001). Clint Eastwood pre-
sents a sophisticated treatment in Letters from Iwo Jima (2006) where Japanese soldiers tempted 
to surrender are prevented by threat of physical violence from their officers, social stigma 
back home, and, in some instances, violence from an enemy depicted killing prisoners. They 
are effectively hemmed in with no choice but to fight for survival: ‘When it comes to war,’ 
Eastwood has said, ‘it’s hard not to think about the “poor slob” fighting for the other side’ 
such as these young Japanese conscripts ‘sent to an island and told don’t plan on coming 
back’.61 In The Big Red One, we first see the consequences of desertion when Sergeant 
Schroeder (the Sarge’s German moral double) shoots an insubordinate private in the African 
desert. But Sarge himself has exactly the same role and more than once it is his known will-
ingness to kill that prevents insubordination among his own men. As Fuller has said in inter-
view, he is a ‘carpenter of death’ symbolizing those who have carried out the same role of 
shaping and directing the younger recruits for thousands of years.62 As a result of these ser-
geants, the grunts, in the words of Clint Eastwood, are ‘at the mercy of what the chain of 
command is up along the line’.63 All soldiers – Just or Unjust – are subject to the same re-
gime; all, therefore, threaten the enemy not by personal moral choice, but under system of 
duress that deflects responsibility to their superiors.64  
The third argument in The Big Red One is that the legal and coercive regime of war constitutes 
a form of collective insanity that robs individuals of moral agency (and hence of the ability to 
be held responsible). In the preface, this is established metaphorically by a horse maddened 
by the surrounding violence. Tearing through the fog, it crushes Sarge’s rifle beneath its 
hooves: as another soldier says shortly afterwards, ‘I suppose horses have as much right to 
go crazy in this war as men have’. An old wooden crucifix is seen in the background, an im-
age of Christ blinded, his eyes hollowed out (it reappears midway through the film). Later, 
when Sarge’s platoon attacks a group of Germans in a hospital for the insane, a deranged pa-
tient seizes a machine-gun, declaring, ‘I am one of you! I am sane!’ as he tears up the room 
                                                          
61 Michael Judge, ‘A Hollywood Icon Lays Down the Law’ (interview with Clint Eastwood, Wall Street 
Journal, Jan. 29, 2011, available at:  
{http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703293204576106080298279672} (accessed, March 
2016). 
62 Roger Ebert, ‘“All war stories are told by survivors”: an interview with Samuel Fuller,’ August 17, 1980, 
available at {www.rogerebert.com/interviews/all-war-stories-are-told-by-survivors-an-interview-with-
samuel-fuller} (accessed, April 2016). 
63 In Judge (2011). 
64 Cf. Walzer (1977), p. 36; on duress as an excuse, see McMahan (2009), §§ 3.2.1, 3.3.2. 
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before being shot.65 In this respect, the film conveys a message similar to Samuel Maoz’s 
Lebanon (2009). A veteran of the war he depicts just like Fuller, Maoz argues: 
Normal people can’t kill. You need to be a psycho. So the trick of war is to take a 
human being and put him in this… situation. […O]ur survival instinct, starts to take 
control [...] You don’t think about moral calls and this is the trick of war.66 
Contemporary moral philosophers are divided over whether one can justify as a legitimate 
act of self-defence the killing of an ‘innocent threat’, someone who may kill you but whose 
psychological or physical predicament means that they are incapable of moral responsibility. 
In The Big Red One, as in Cross of Iron, all participants have lost their agency at least to some 
extent. All exercise not a right of self-defence, but something closer to a Hobbesian right of 
self-preservation. In this condition, as The Big Red One’s narrator concludes, war is ‘about sur-
vivors. The surviving is the only glory in war...’ 
4 The Unjust Warrior inculpated 
Rhiannon Harries suggests that it has become ‘a moral imperative that any modern represen-
tation of war demonstrates the suffering that spans battlelines’ and thus delivers ‘a message 
of common humanity’.67 This captures something of the way the films discussed above ap-
proached the figure of the Unjust Warrior but, in fact, some of the most popular and cele-
brated contributions to post-Cold War Just War Cinema explore precisely the opposite view: 
that ‘humanity’ is on the side of the Just Warrior meaning that the enemy must in some sense 
have lost their humanity; they are not just my enemy, but the enemy of mankind. As such, the 
enemy becomes, in Carl Schmitt’s words, ‘an unperson, and his life is no longer of the high-
est value: it becomes worthless and must be destroyed’.68   
In this part, I focus primarily on two films that adopt the kind of morally asymmetric view 
that Schmitt warned about. First I interpret Steven Spielberg’s Saving Private Ryan (1998)69 as 
a challenge to the egalitarian conventions of what we might call ‘orthodox’ Just War Cinema 
and the expression of an asymmetric, anti-egalitarian ethic flowing directly from the jus ad 
bellum. This sets a pattern followed in more recent accounts in Band of Brothers (2001), The Pa-
                                                          
65 A Bridge Too Far also shows paratroopers meeting the dazed and smiling escaped inmates of a mental 
hospital.  
66 Rachel Cooke, Interview with Samuel Maoz, Israeli film director, The Observer, May 2, 2010, pp. 18-20, 
at p. 20. 
67 Rhiannon Harries, ‘A ship goes down, but Bleasdale's writing wins the day for BBC drama’, The Inde-
pendent, 9th January, 2011. Available at: {http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-
entertainment/tv/reviews/the-sinking-of-the-laconia-bbc2-thursday-amp-fridaysun-sex-and-suspicious-
parents-bbc3-monday-2179621.html} 
68 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, tr. George Schwab (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996), p. 
79, xxii, 54. On the psychological tendency to demonize enemies in war, see David Hume, A Treatise of 
Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), 2.2.3.2 
(though cf. 2.2.5.10 on respect for POWs). 
69 Dir. Steven Spielberg. [DVD]. UK: Paramount Home Entertainment. 
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cific (2010) and David Ayer’s Fury (2014).70 I then turn to Quentin Tarantino’s Inglourious 
Basterds (2009), which I interpret as a dramatic reductio of the asymmetric view. 
‘Brothers’ 
In a conversation among the US Rangers whose story forms the main focus of Saving Private 
Ryan, one recalls a ‘saying’: ‘If God’s on our side, who the hell could be on theirs?’ His book-
ish comrade, Corporal Upham, corrects him citing the original question (from St Paul’s Letter 
to the Romans, 8.31): ‘If God is for us, who can be against us?’ Both versions are telling but the 
difference even more so. St Paul’s suggestion that the power of God is such that no enemy 
can withstand it casts the Allied war as the medieval Chrisitan bellum justum, the righteous par-
ty acting to enforce God’s law.71 The modified version, however, goes a significant step fur-
ther: if God is on our side, it suggests, then your side can only be supported by God’s enemy, 
Satan himself. On one reading the text argues simply that the enemy cannot win; on the oth-
er, he becomes the servant if not the embodiment of evil.72 
The altered quotation reflects the ethic of Spielberg’s film as a whole. As with the television 
films he since co-produced, Band of Brothers (whose title invokes the just war themes in 
Shakespeare’s Henry V) and Pacific, and like the more recent Fury, Ryan views World War 
Two in unapologetically asymmetric terms. In none of these pictures do we see any of the 
elements identified in part 3 as lending dignity to the enemy, and the idea of common hu-
manity is effaced by the radically differentiated treatment given to soldiers on opposing sides: 
‘It is no longer acceptable,’ as John Hodgkins infers, ‘to simply survive a war; one has to earn 
the right to come home’. This one does by committing oneself to the righteous violence of 
the just war, a duty that only the Americans can claim to discharge.73  
In Ryan, Brothers, and Fury, the evil that stands behind the enemy, of course, is Nazism and 
the Holocaust. Brothers will follow The Big Red One in portraying the Allied discovery of the 
death camps. Ryan, however, relies on the recollections of an audience that will already have 
                                                          
70 Dir. David Ayer. [Blu-ray]. UK: Sony Pictures Home Entertainment. 
71 Stephen C. Neff, War and the Law of Nations: a General History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), pp. 46-7; on ambiguity between ‘just war’ and ‘holy war’ in medieval thought, see Frederick H. 
Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 2. 
72 Cf. Oliver Cromwell’s speech in Schmitt (1996), pp. 67-8, on ‘that enmity that is in him against whatso-
ever is of God.’ Philip French notes that the actress who plays the elderly Ryan’s wife as he visits a war 
grave previously played the angel who welcomed the souls of fallen Allied soldiers to heave in A Matter of 
Life and Death (1946), perhaps further reinforcing the theology. See French, ‘Ryan’s Slaughter,’ The Observ-
er, September 13, 1998. Available at:  
{http://www.theguardian.com/film/News_Story/Critic_Review/Observer/0,4267,36480,00.html} (ac-
cessed, April 2016) John Hodgkins suggests the references to God reflect George Bush Sr’s religious 
rhetoric (‘In the Wake of Desert Storm: a Consideration of Modern World War II Films’, Journal of Popular 
Film and Television, 30.2 (2002): 74-84, p. 77). 
73 Hodgkins (2002), p. 77. Weber (2005) argues that a particular conception of the family is offered in US 
cinema as what American soldiers are fighting for which sheds some light on the way Ryan provokes au-
dience indignation at German aggression (threatening ‘sons’ and ‘husbands’). 
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seen Spielberg’s Schindler’s List (1993) (a film regarded as seminal in informing public aware-
ness74) and only alludes to the genocide indirectly through the character of Stanley Mellish, a 
Jewish private in Captain John Miller’s platoon. Fury simply identifies the enemies as ‘Nazi’ 
soldiers and invokes the pseudo-theology of Ryan’s holy war to specify the moral status of all 
Germans in uniform: ‘do you think Jesus loves Hitler? [...] What about your regular-issue 
Nazi line trooper?’, asks Sergeant Don (‘Wardaddy’) Collier of his gunner, Boyd (‘Bible’) 
Swan. Bible thinks anyone can be saved who ‘accepted Jesus into his heart and got baptized,’ 
but thinks ‘[i]t ain’t gonna save [Hitler] from men’s justice’, and neither, it seems, will it save 
those who serve him as the tank crew’s practice of summary execution will demonstrate. 
Unlike some of the films discussed in part 3, Ryan and its successors eschew entirely the use 
of multiple perspectives. Ryan’s Normandy landings invite emotional identification only with 
the Americans. The staging of slaughter under the German defences helped establish the 
film’s popular reputation as one of the most ‘realistic’ war films yet produced (a claim which 
Fury seems to have been intended to rival). But the only concession to the enemy’s perspec-
tive is a shot depicting Americans in a German’s machinegun sights, a device reinforcing the 
impression of a faceless threat, heartless, lethal, and inhuman.75 In contrast, Spielberg’s 
Americans – just like Ayer’s – are quickly individuated (played by actors familiar as ‘the 
cream of young Hollywood talent’76) and presented as a sympathetic focus for the audience.  
Only two Germans are individuated in Ryan to any degree but they remain anonymous and 
both, tellingly, cause the deaths of key American ‘characters.’ One is a Waffen-SS member 
shown bayoneting Mellish slowly at the end of an agonizing hand-to-hand struggle. The oth-
er (listed in the credits as ‘Steamboat Willie’) is captured by the rangers after his machine-gun 
position kills Irwin Wade, the medic. His story develops the most troubling upshot of Spiel-
berg’s ethic, which is the film’s close focus on the killing of Unjust Warriors after they sur-
render. The theme is introduced as soon as the US soldiers breach the German defences at 
Normandy through a quick succession of killings culminating in the execution of soldiers as 
they surrender. This initiates a revisionary tendency in the ethical thrust of the film as a 
whole: as the critic Philip French noted, ‘we see, and are only moderately shocked by, angry, 
exhausted GIs killing German soldiers who emerge from pillboxes with their hands up’.77   
In Ryan, Tom Hanks’s Captain Miller provides a moral compass, guiding both the actinos of 
the privates under his command and, hence, the viewer’s judgement. Initially he seems trou-
bled by the executions but when the rangers capture Steamboat Willie, Miller wavers and he 
permits the soldiers to make him dig his own grave. Only at the last minute does he order the 
                                                          
74 Pat Reid, ‘Empire Essay: Saving Private Ryan,’ Empire Magazine, January ,1 2000, available online at: 
{http://www.empireonline.com/movies/empire-essay-saving-private-ryan-2/review/} (accessed April 
2016). 
75 On apparent interchangeability of individual enemies in Ryan, see Morris (2007) p. 293. 
76 Reid (2000). 
77 French (1998). Early in Band of Brothers, Ronald Speirs executes German prisoners, establishing an am-
biguous character that his comrades (and through them, the audience) eventually learn to admire. In Pacific 
too Eugene Sledge progresses from restraint to vengeance against enemy soldiers.  
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man’s release (under pressure from Corporal Upham), instructing him to surrender to the 
next Allied soldiers he meets. Later, Miller’s decision is brought into question when Willie 
shoots him dead in Ramelle. As Krin Gabbard writes, ‘the moral is not lost’ on Upham.78 It 
is for the Corporal, now, to retract Miller’s clemency, underlining the idea that the immunity 
of German prisoners in this war is not an absolute matter. Previously unable to make the crit-
ical transition from bookish ‘beautiful soul’, to use Elshtain’s words, to heroic ‘just warrior’ 
and save Mellish he has the chance to redeem himself when he recognizes – and is recog-
nized by – Willie, captured at gunpoint along with a group of Waffen SS.79 With a military 
band sobbing nobly in the soundtrack, Upham summarily shoots the Unjust Warrior as an 
example to the others, his conversion to the Just Warrior of revisionary Just War Cinema 
complete. He achieves ‘a type of dignity or manhood … through killing’ and thereby earns 
his place in the band of brothers.80 
Ryan’s treatment of the ethics of killing is less verbally explicit than The Big Red One. Yet it 
clearly has something to say on the subject: ‘the film … condones war crimes (the killing of 
prisoners of war). This is its clear moral,’ as a letter published by Sight and Sound declared.81 It 
is hard not to read Upham’s first killing as the culmination of a permissive argument devel-
oping through earlier scenes. And, indeed, the American film critic, Roger Ebert, seems to be 
referring obliquely to this aspect of Ryan when he interprets Upham not only as an avatar for 
the audience but also as the embodiment of a ‘philosophical’ argument inscribed in the film’s 
action. As the culmination of a nuanced commentary on war delivered almost exclusively 
through image and action, it is what Upham does at the end of the film, Ebert suggests, that 
concludes an argument expressed nonverbally through the film as a whole.82   
Notably, the crime for which Spielberg’s rangers crave satisfaction (and the audience as it is 
drawn along by the film’s emotional logic) is specifically the killing of Just Warriors strug-
gling against Nazism (the Americans who died in their thousands on the beach, then Wade, 
then Mellish and eventually Miller himself) rather than the crimes committed within the con-
centration camps as such.83 Likewise, a captured soldier in Fury, whom Wardaddy forces an 
inexperienced private to kill, is singled out for wearing a US army coat, linking him in the 
Americans’ minds to the death of a comrade. As Jason Isaacs’ Captain Waggoner declares (in 
                                                          
78 In Krin Gabbard, ‘Saving Private Ryan too Late,’ in John Lewis (ed) The End of Cinema as we Know It: 
American Cinema in the Nineties (London: Pluto Press, 2001), p. 123. 
79 Jean Bethke Elshtain, ‘On Beautiful Souls, Just Warriors, and Feminist Consciousness,’ Women’s Studies 
International Forum, 5:3-4 (1982): 341-48. In the German TV series, Generation War (2013), Friedhelm Win-
ter undergoes a similar transformation from the ‘poet’ to war criminal.   
80 Pace Morris (2007) pp. 294-5. The phrase is from Hodgkins (2002) p. 78. 
81 D. L. Ouran, ‘Evil Ryan,’ Sight and Sound, March 1, 1999, p. 64. 
82 Ebert (1998). On Ryan’s permissive ethos and the escalation from executing soldiers ‘spontaneously’ to 
doing so ‘calculatedly,’ see Morris (2007) p. 292.  
83 Cf. Philippa Gates, ‘ “Fighting the Good Fight:” The Real and the Moral in the Contemporary Holly-
wood Combat Film,’ Quarterly Review of Film and Video, 22.4 (2005): 297-310, p. 307. See also Morris (2007) 
p. 281.  
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flat rejection of The Big Red One), ‘You just paste them hard for me: they murdered some good 
boys out there today.’84  
In fact, there are several apparent references to The Big Red One in Fury, each challenging its 
central claims. ‘Fury’ is a Sherman tank, its name recalling the Eumenides, vengeful demigods 
of the Oresteia of Aeschylus. After the opening scene, its crewmen initially lay responsibility 
for the death of their comrade – ‘Red’ – which occurred just before the film’s beginning at 
the feet of Wardaddy, their sergeant. But then they change their minds, transferring blame 
from Don to ‘the Germans’. Just like Lee Marvin’s ‘Sarge’, Wardaddy plays a paternal role for 
the privates. But whereas Sarge has a German double and his role – as both their protector 
and coercer – is mirrored in such a way as to coax the audience of The Big Red One into sym-
pathizing with soldiers in general, Fury makes no concessions to the Germans who are consist-
ently portrayed as the ‘murderers’ whose threat it is Wardaddy’s job to help his men survive. 
And like Sarge, Wardaddy is first seen bayonetting a German officer in a prefatory scene set 
in the foggy aftermath of battle. Just as in The Big Red One, there is a white horse, but this one 
is calm after he liberates it from its German rider. For the sergeant and his comrades, war 
may be hell but it is not insane because, while ‘[i]deals are peaceful, history is violent,’ as he 
explains to Private Norman (whose greenhorn status identifies him with the audience: we 
learn what he learns). And for the Wardaddy, there is no angst about the killing: war contin-
ues until the murderous threat has been eliminated.  
‘Basterds’ 
At first glance, Quentin Tarantino’s Inglourious Basterds (2009) resembles a contribution to the 
‘brothers’ school of Just War Cinema.85 Having established a classic Nazi villain in the open-
ing scene – Christoph Waltz’s SS Colonel Hans Landa, the ‘Jew Hunter’ – the film sets off 
on two narrative tracks with the introduction of Shosanna Dreyfuss and Aldo Raine. Drey-
fuss narrowly escapes Landa’s soldiers when they murder her family but shows up some time 
later in Paris as the owner of a cinema. Raine is leader of ‘the Bastards,’ a special platoon of 
Jewish-American ‘guerrillas’ sent behind enemy lines to kill and mutilate German soldiers. 
Their stories eventually converge in simultaneous plots by Dreyfuss and the Bastards to as-
sassinate Hitler and the senior Nazi leadership. At a number of points in the film, viewers are 
exposed to images of bloody violence played out on the bodies of the Germans, culminating 
in the disintegration of Hitler’s face as he is relentlessly machine-gunned by Sergeant Donny 
Donowitz, the ‘Bear Jew.’ Superficially, therefore, the film reads as an elaborate revenge fan-
tasy, radicalizing the retributive approach to the enemy developed in Ryan and Fury. On this 
level, it shares something with the joyous vengefulness of Tarantino’s Django Unchained 
(2013).86 But closer attention reveals elements in the film’s construction pointing towards an 
                                                          
84 Emphasis added. 
85 [Blu-ray]. UK: Universal Pictures UK. 
86 On the reception of Inglourious as ‘Jewish revenge porn’ as well as sources criticising the film along these 
lines, see Alexander Darius Ornella, ‘Disruptive Violence as a Means to Create Space for Reflection: 
Thoughts on Tarantino’s Attempts at Audience Irritation,’ in Robert von Dassanowsky (ed.) Inglourious 
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argument strongly at odds with revisionist Just War Cinema. This comes across particularly 
from the way Inglourious explores the theme of the military uniform and a soldier’s ability to 
extricate himself from the moral status it bestows.  
Uniforms are rendered ambiguous by the debates I am considering here. In the perspective 
of the law of war (and of orthodox Just War Theory / Cinema), they bestow the special sta-
tus of combatant, including recognition as an equal before your enemy. Crucially, uniforms 
may be discarded when war ends (The Big Red One) or if you exit the war by entering neutral 
territory (as in La Grande Illusion). As long as you kill only enemy soldiers within the war, you 
have no crimes to answer for once you leave it behind you. But in the asymmetric perspec-
tive of revisionist Just War films like Ryan, this prospect is rendered doubtful. You fought for 
the Third Reich; you thereby supported its crimes; and in doing so you killed Just Warriors 
who fought only to prevent the spread of Nazism. Why, they ask, should you be able to set 
aside your identity as the Unjust Warrior so easily?  
At its surface, Inglourious mimics the retributive logic of moral asymmetry. Only one German 
is allowed to survive each attack by the Bastards. He is released with an instruction to spread 
the word about what they did and, before setting him free, Raine always asks him one thing: 
what will he do with his uniform after the war? The usual answer is that he will take it off 
and happily throw it away. Hearing this, Raine then cuts a Swastika into his forehead with a 
bowie knife, making his identity as Unjust Warrior permanent. But even while Inglourious 
overtly challenges the Doctrine of Moral Equality at one level, it simultaneously subverts the 
challenge at another.  
Consider Sergeant Werner Rachtman, the first German soldier we see ‘executed’ by the Bas-
tards. Were we intended to feel unalloyed sympathy with them at this point, then we might 
expect Rachtman to display an array of inculpating characteristics. But there is really only one 
gesture pointing in that direction and it is rendered ambiguous by the context that motivates 
it. When Rachtman refers to the Bastards as ‘Jew dogs,’ it isn’t presented as a spontaneous 
expression of his views; it is uttered as a gesture of defiance once it is clear that Raine will 
order the Bear Jew to murder him in violation of the same codes of military conduct that 
Rachtman himself scrupulously adheres to. In all other respects, Rachtman (by contrast with 
Landa) is portrayed as a Wehrmacht soldier simpliciter, not a war criminal. Upon meeting 
Raine, Rachtman makes the proper gesture of respect between enemies, saluting his captor. 
Notably, he does so with hand to forehead, not with the Hitler salute. Raine interrogates him 
about the location of snipers, threatening to let the Bear Jew kill him if he won’t divulge. 
Rachtman ‘respectfully’ refuses to cooperate (as is his entitlement as a POW) to avoid risking 
‘German lives’. As if to try to force him back into the genocidal stereotype, Donowitz taunts 
him and asks whether he won the Iron Cross for ‘killing Jews’. Rachtman’s reply invokes a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Basterds: a Manipulation of Metacinema. London: Continuum, 2013, pp. 226-27. Thanks to Steven de Wijze 
for emphasizing the theme of revenge in Tarantino’s revenge films.  
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purely military code of honour: he won it for ‘bravery.’ And with that, as good as his word, 
he lets himself be beaten to death with a baseball bat rather than betray his comrades.87  
As an Unjust Warrior, Rachtman’s type does not come from the Ryan subgenre. He has 
greater affinity with the Worthy Enemies of earlier films and his predicament invites a dis-
comfiting comparison with the scenes in which Rommel refuses to interrogate captured Al-
lied soldiers in Desert Fox and Desert Rats. Compare the leading Bastard, Aldo Raine. Played 
by Brad Pitt, a Hollywood ‘star’, Raine is flagged as the ‘lead role.’ But his status is subverted 
repeatedly throughout the film. Landa appears first, has more lines (in no fewer than four 
languages) and ultimately seizes control of Raine’s plot when he secures a final say over 
whether the Bastards’ can go ahead and end World War II.88 By contrast, Raine is jarringly 
crude throughout the film, morally, militarily, strategically and intellectually. If he leads the 
moral rebellion against the laws of war, he does so as a character who lacks both sophistica-
tion and real agency.89 
One layer of Tarantino’s reductio of the subgenre is thus seen in counter-stereotypes: the dig-
nified German sergeant; the bloodthirsty American; the intellectually virtuosic but genocidal 
SS (anti-)hero who brings peace. A second is added through the casting of Eli Roth – better 
known as the director of the ‘torture porn’ Hostel movies – as the Bear Jew.   
By casting Roth, Tarantino draws attention to what is going on within the film through deci-
sions that are taken (as it were) outside the film. The climax of Inglourious converges on a cin-
ema at which a Nazi propaganda film will be shown called Nation’s Pride. This film-within-
the-film depicts the exploits of Private Friedrich Zoller, a sniper who single-handedly massa-
cred several hundred American soldiers in only three days. The implicit comparison becomes 
clear as we watch the vengeful glee of its German audience (within Inglourious).90 As we (the 
viewers of Inglourious) watch them (Hitler, Goebbels, and the audience of Nation’s Pride), the 
grotesque resemblance between their enjoyment and ours calls into question any emotional 
enjoyment we might experienced in seeing the slaughter of German soldiers in Inglourious and 
the war films it recalls. Roth’s significance is twofold: first, his presence recalls the torture-
porn he is better known for, inviting comparison with the gore of Inglourious; second, it turns 
out that Tarantino assigned Roth the job of making Nation’s Pride itself. So it was the man 
playing the Bear Jew who really (in our world) directed Nation’s Pride, the spoof parody of (the 
official plot of) Inglourious. Roth thus appears at once as the maker of films about sadism, as 
the bloody killer of prisoners of war and (behind the scenes) as the real director (in our world) 
                                                          
87 Compare Ornella’s reading (2013, pp. 322-23) which also notes Rachtman’s courage and the ambiva-
lence viewers are likely to feel as their complicity in murderous voyeurism is highlighted. 
88 On the other hand, Shosanna Dreyfus is a good deal less ambiguous and more sympathetic. In fact, her 
conspiracy to kill Hitler and the German leadership renders attempts to do so by the Bastards unneces-
sary.  
89 By contrast, Ayer seems to redeem something of Raine in the more sophisticated (polyglot) tank com-
mander of Fury. Raine’s behaviour towards German soldiers is recalled by our first sight of Wardaddy 
ambushing a German officer and killing him with the knife he keeps in his boot.  
90 The scene also recalls the beach scenes in Ryan. 
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of the spoof ‘torture porn’ movie in the fictional space of Inglourious. This short-circuits the 
distinctions between fact, movie-fact and movie-fiction and underlines the connection be-
tween ‘our’ enjoyment of the Bastards’ slaughter and the Germans’ pleasure in watching 
Zoller’s.91 The comparison thus brings any satisfaction we might gain from the Bastards’ ‘jus-
tice’ – and, by association, that of the various Brothers movies – into question, morally and 
aesthetically.92  
5 Conclusions 
I hope the film interpretations in sections 3 and 4 will have convinced readers of Just War 
Cinema’s ability to offer moral arguments. If so, then it is worth concluding with some 
comment on the influence it might have socially. I think the ability to reach such a wide au-
dience means that Just War Cinema may be either an enormous help to theorists (and others 
such as the ICRC) in their efforts to shape public opinion or, depending on what it is argu-
ing, a dangerous hindrance. 
The first is seen in Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars. When Walzer argues that Unjust Warriors 
might yet be principled and honourable, he does so with reference to Rommel, just as Desert 
Fox did in 1951. And like the film, Walzer’s source is the biography by Desmond Young.93 
But I want to suggest a further possible interconnection. Rommel was a useful illustration 
because Walzer could refer readers to Rommel’s ambiguous status in popular lore about 
World War II. And one widely accessed influence on this lore was Desert Fox. Walzer, in oth-
er words, was able to rely on a public already primed to find the validity of a key component 
of orthodox Just War Theory intuitive and cinema is part of the explanation. The theory, as 
Walzer said himself, interpreted ‘a moral doctrine ready at hand, a connected set of names 
and concepts that we all knew – and that everyone else knew’.94  
If the films in section 3 are part of the explanation for wider public awareness of the ortho-
doxies Walzer alluded to, those in section 4 suggest that the resulting consensus is likely to 
have suffered some damage more recently. Since Spielberg’s Ryan, the immunities of the Un-
just Warrior have taken a battering. And, of course, Ryan’s offspring aren’t limited to treat-
ments of the ‘Good War’ of 1939/1941-1945 but have more recently depicted US armed en-
gagements since 9/11 (e.g. Zero Dark Thirty (2012)). Seth Rogan’s controversial comment that 
Eastwood’s American Sniper (2014) reminded him of Nation’s Pride takes on greater signifi-
                                                          
91 Note that this doesn’t necessary affect the viewer’s attitude towards Shosanna Dreyfus’s plan to avenge 
her murdered family and defeat the Nazis which is entirely independent of the Bastards’ story. 
92 Controversy over Seth Rogan’s Tweet about American Sniper recalling Nation’s Pride suggests Roth’s 
movie raises painful questions for those seduced by the morally one-sided cinema discussed in part 4.1. 
See Christopher Rosen, ‘Seth Rogan Clarifies ‘American Sniper’ Tweet’, Huffington Post, January 19, 2015, 
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93 Desmond Young, Rommel: the Desert Fox (London: Collins, 1950); Walzer cites a 1958 edition of the 
book (1977, p. 339 n.4). 
94 Walzer (1977), p. xvii.  
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cance when viewed in this context.95 The moral asymmetries of unapologetically populist 
cinema are now dressed up as a frank, accurate, and serious depiction of history. But as 
Philippa Gates argues, the ‘“authentic” and “realistic” combat sequences that define the new 
Hollywood war film [...] do not necessarily offer a more accurate portrayal of war and most 
often merely mask increasingly idealistic moral assertions’.96 Idealistic they may be in some 
respects, but they risk inscribing on public understanding an ethical grammar that is deeply 
troubling both morally and aesthetically, as Inglourious suggests. 
From the perspective of Just War Theory and its concern with limiting the destructiveness of 
war, I think this trend should be seen as profoundly worrying. The best of Just War Theory 
aims to inform opinion not only in academia but also beyond. But it hardly needs stating that 
cinema has a greater capacity to engage popular attention than the writing – however lucid 
and simply stated – of academic philosophers. As Sam Fuller declared, ‘[t]he power of the 
camera […] is exactly like bold-faced type; you cannot compete with it […] Don’t talk about 
it, show it.’97 My closing thought is that films following the pattern of Ryan show how Just 
War Cinema might therefore vitiate the aims of contemporary Just War Theory.  
Consider the social aim of McMahan’s challenge to orthodox theory: to erode the confidence 
of soldiers in doctrines claiming to absolve them of moral responsibility for killing in unjust 
wars. A successful challenge, McMahan hopes, might make it more difficult for governments 
to start morally dubious wars, thereby reducing their frequency.98 But the analytical blade 
cuts the other way too: what happens when governments successfully persuade their soldiers 
that they do have just cause? And what if soldiers absorb their scepticism about the Doctrine 
of Moral Equality less from philosophy than from the revisionist cinema of Spielberg and 
Ayer? It comes as no surprise to read of Colonel David Hackworth’s remark that, during the 
1990s, ‘the self-image and self-esteem of US troops were greatly colored by “Hollywood” 
movies’.99 If they thereby internalized the ethos I discussed in the ‘Brothers’ subsection and 
then supposed themselves to be fighting in a contemporary just war, it could motivate a radi-
cally increased permissiveness, particularly in behaviour towards captured enemies, with the 
risks of reciprocal escalation that this is likely to bring in its wake (a dark thought indeed in 
the era of Abu Ghraib).  
As the ICRC ‘People on War’ report states, ‘[c]onsciousness of the Geneva Conventions 
matters’: ‘[p]eople that are unaware of the Conventions are more likely not to help or save a 
wounded or surrendering enemy combatant that had killed someone close to them’.100 But of 
course it’s not enough that people know about the Conventions; they also have to believe that 
                                                          
95 Rosen (2015). On apologetics for US assertiveness post-9/11 in cinema, see David Hastings Dunn, ‘The 
Incredibles: an ordinary day tale of a Superpower in a Post-9/11 Worlds,’ Millennium, 34.2 (2006): 559-62.  
96 Gates (2005), p. 298. 
97 Interviewed by Richard Schickel {https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zP5BhK_xMlA} accessed, 5 
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they are morally valid. Both those concerned with reinforcing this belief for the sake of hu-
manitarian purposes and the revisionist philosophers who raise legitimate doubts about the 
potentially permissive consequences of doing so need to figure out how best to pursue their 
aims in the face of the rival (and potentially dangerous) influences on public opinion in 
popular media. 
 
 
 
